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Abstract: Lack of consensus on the multifaceted concept of tax avoidance has caused us to witness a plethora 
of proxies that have been developed to measure and capture tax avoidance for the purpose of empirical 
analysis. Therefore, this study contributes to the literature on tax avoidance as it seeks to find out the 
similarity or differences between tax avoidance measures, with specific emphasis on effective tax rate based 
measures. Conducting the ANOVA and the Games Howell multiple comparison tests on a sample of 673 
unbalanced firm-year observations, the study found that there is a significant difference between the 
examined measures, while the Games Howell test further showed that the H & S measure differs significantly 
from the ETR based measures. The implication of the findings for researchers is that they are to consider their 
research objectives before deciding on the measure of tax avoidance to use in their study, as there are 
significant differences between these measures. 
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1. Introduction 
Tax avoidance has been at the forefront of academic research in recent times, especially as a result of 
the increasing awareness amongst stakeholders and government of the threat associated with tax 
avoidance, such as, loss of revenue and public benefits to the society. It is a known fact that the 
government relies on the revenue generated from the taxpayers to fund its activities, such as, providing 
the necessary infrastructural facilities for the citizenry. Therefore, activities that reduce the tax burdens 
of the taxpayers make it difficult for the government to get sufficient fund to provide its mandate to 
the citizens. 
Tax avoidance is practiced globally with events such as the Luxembourg leaks in 2014, the Panama 
papers in 2016, and the recent Paradise leak in 2017 (Fitzgibbon & Starkman, 2017) further reiterating 
enormous tax avoidance by individuals and corporate taxpayers.  In the developed countries, the issue 
of tax avoidance has taken a center stage especially with the loss of tax revenue needed by the 
government to execute its mandates. In the United States of America for instance, the loss of tax 
revenue is reported to be close to 70 billion dollars annually, which is close to 20% of the corporate 
tax revenue collected annually (Zucman, 2017). Also, in developing economies, tax avoidance is not a 
new trend with an estimated amount of up to 9.6 billion dollars a year being lost by the West African 
region in general and Nigeria losing an estimated 2.9 billion dollars in particular (Action Aid and Tax 
Justice Network, 2015). 
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Despite the attention in the media, academia, and research environ, there seems to be no generally 
agreed definition for tax avoidance (Dunbar, Higgins, Phillips, & Plesko, 2010; Gebhart, 2017; 
Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010) and this may account for the numerous proxies and measurements for tax 
avoidance (Salihu, Obid, & Annuar, 2013). Put differently, conceptualizing tax avoidance is riddled 
with bottlenecks and disagreements. This may be as a result of the multidimensional nature of tax 
avoidance.  Dunbar et al. (2010) opined that the challenge of a lack of a generally accepted definition 
for tax avoidance makes its measurement challenging for empirical researchers. In addition, Blouin 
(2014:875) asserts that this lack of consensus also creates confusion and inconsistency in tax 
avoidance measurements by researchers such that “ad-hoc approaches to developing and testing any 
hypotheses” bothering on tax avoidance has to be employed.  
The commonly cited definition in literature for tax avoidance is that it is an act aimed at reducing 
explicit tax liability (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). Such an act may broadly include investment in 
bonds, use of tax reliefs and exemptions, lobbying activities, and other uncertain tax positions (Hanlon 
& Heitzman, 2010). Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) assert that when tax avoidance is aggressively done, 
it can be described as employing a wide range of reporting practices whose real intent is to reduce tax 
liability without any real business activity. In addition, Chen, Chen, Cheng, and Shevlin (2010) 
portray tax avoidance as any arrangement to reduce tax liability and these arrangements when 
scrutinized, form a continuum of legitimate, grey, or unlawful activities. They also opine that those 
arrangements that are grouped as grey arrangements better portray the aggressive practice of tax 
avoidance. Therefore, tax avoidance however legitimate, could end up being unlawful when it is done 
aggressively, which in the words of Hanlon and Heitzman (2010:137) is “pushing the envelope of tax 
law”.  
The opinion of Chen et al. (2010) may account for why various concepts have been introduced in 
literature to explain the act of reducing tax liability. These terms as used interchangeably include tax 
avoidance; tax minimization; tax planning; tax aggressiveness; tax management; and tax sheltering 
(Boussaidi & Hamed, 2015; Graham, Hanlon, Shevlin, & Shroff, 2014; Richardson, Taylor, & Lanis, 
2013). Also, Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) observed that aggressiveness is a very relative term and the 
real research interest is usually on excessive exploitation of loopholes in the tax system (aggressive tax 
avoidance, evasion, sheltering, and haven).  
Based on the foregoing, there is obviously a debate on the concept of tax avoidance as deduced from 
the various related terms used in literature. This debate also confirms the position of Dunbar et al. 
(2010) and Blouin (2014) on the lack of consensus on the definition of tax avoidance and 
inconsistency in tax avoidance measurements. Furthermore, there are numerous measures developed 
and used by researchers in exploring tax avoidance practices and according to Hanlon and Heitzman 
(2010), these measures are largely similar in that they capture non-conform tax avoidance although 
their assertion was not backed by empirical analysis. Conversely, Salihu et al. (2013) using Malaysian 
data found that effective tax rate based measures are significantly not the same based on the outcome 
of the ANOVA. In addition, Gebhart (2017) investigate tax avoidance measures in terms of their 
similarities using data available on Compustat and found that “although the different measures of 
corporate tax avoidance do exhibit differences and those differences persist over time; measures based 
on the same rationale (such as Effective Tax Rate measures) are subject to large correlation among one 
another". In other words, his findings reveal differences between the broad categories of tax avoidance 
measures but similarities within each category. These further buttresses the measurement issue 
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associated with researches on tax avoidance and the findings on the similarities and differences of tax 
avoidance measures are inconclusive and largely under-researched, especially in developing countries. 
Also, in conducting empirical researches, it is important that the variables of interest are properly 
measured because failure to ensure this may lead to poor inferences, which are most likely to be 
biased. Nachmias and Nachmias (2009) explained that to properly measure a concept, both the 
operational and conceptual definitions must be correctly spelled out. While the conceptual definition 
involves defining a concept based on what is generally agreed, operational definition involves defining 
a concept with reference to the procedures or processes that are conducted in order to relate an abstract 
concept to reality. We believe that the link between these two definitions is that if a concept can be 
conceptualized properly, providing an operational definition should not be difficult.   
Therefore, it is against the above backdrop that this study seeks to find out the similarity or differences 
between tax avoidance measures with specific emphasis on effective tax rate based measures. In 
actualizing the objective of the study, three ETR based measures and the Henry & Sansing measure 
[argued to be superior to ETR based measure as it avoids data truncation bias and is proposed by 
Henry & Sansing (2014) to capture conforming tax avoidance] were compared using the ANOVA and 
the Games Howell multiple comparison test. The result of the ANOVA revealed a significant 
difference between the examined measures while the Games Howell test further showed that the H & 
S measure differs significantly from the ETR based measures. Thus, this study contributes to 
knowledge on the issue of measuring tax avoidance in this regards. It is also relevant as it provides 
empirical evidence to show that ETR based measures are largely similar except for ETR derived by 
dividing cash tax by cash flow from operations. Therefore, it may just likely capture a different aspect 
of tax avoidance not captured by the other ETR based measures.   
The structure of this study is as follows: section 2 captures the review of literature and hypotheses 
formulation; section 3 provides information on the methodology; section 4 bothers on the discussion 
of findings; section 5 harps on the conclusion, recommendations, and limitation of the study. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Formulation 
2.1. Operationalizing Tax Avoidance  
Most studies on tax avoidance have focused more on the non-conforming aspect than the 
conforming due to the relative ease of measurement and source of information (Badertscher et 
al., 2016). Non-conforming tax avoidance involves reducing taxable income without reducing 
accounting income while conforming involves a reduction in both incomes. In addition, studies 
that have investigated the practice of tax avoidance can be grouped into three (Annuar, Salihu, 
& Obid, 2014). These three groups are (1) those that measure tax avoidance using the ratio of 
tax to income (effective tax rate), (2) those that measure tax avoidance using the gap between 
book and taxable income (book-tax gap), and (3) those that used other measures asides these 
first two measures. However, this study focuses on just the first group (effective tax rate) due to 
the availability of data, and the high frequency of its usage in literature. 
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2.2. Effective Tax Rate (ETR) Measure of Tax Avoidance  
This measure is used to capture tax avoidance practices by dividing the tax expense in the financial 
statement by pre-tax accounting income or cash (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). This gives a figure 
which ordinarily should lie between 0 and 1. In performing this calculation, the intention of the 
researcher is paramount. When the researcher is interested in the distribution of tax burden across 
companies and industries, or the fairness of the tax system, the average ETR should be calculated; 
while if the interest is on an evaluation of new investment, the marginal ETR should be calculated 
(Gupta & Newberry, 1997). In addition, from a time perspective, if the researcher is interested in a 
yearly rate of tax avoidance which is usually susceptible to time variations, the annual ETR should be 
calculated. However, if the interest is on several years, the long-run ETR is the more appropriate rate 
(Gebhart, 2017). The long-run measure of ETR was propounded by Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew 
(2008) to address the issue of volatility. It is more or less the same with the annual measure except that 
it is measured as the cumulative tax expense/current expense/cash tax over a period of years divided 
by pre-tax accounting income over the same number of years (Zeng, 2010). 
Aside from the above-mentioned broad categories of the ETR, specific variants of the ETR include 
accounting ETR, current ETR, cash ETR, and cash flow ETR. They are subsequently discussed below. 
2.2.1. Accounting ETR  
Accounting ETR is the ratio of tax expense to pre-tax income as reported in the income statement 
(Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). As a result of the accrual concept, tax expense is usually a combination 
of both current and deferred tax liability. Current tax is the portion of tax payable by applying the 
current tax rate on the profit for the year while deferred tax is the portion of tax expenses resulting 
from temporal timing difference (the difference between the carrying amount and tax base of an 
asset/liability). 
One of the limitations of this measure is that it fails to capture deferral tax strategies [strategies by a 
company to minimize tax liability using management discretion and choice of accounting policies] 
(Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). The reason for this is not farfetched since deferred tax is a portion of 
total tax expense and increases [decreases] in the current tax expense are offset by corresponding 
decreases [increases] in the deferred tax expense. Another limitation is that it does not capture 
conforming tax avoidance and it suffers from truncation bias in a situation where the pre-tax 
accounting income is negative [loss] (Henry & Sansing, 2014). 
2.2.2. Current ETR  
This is a variant of the accounting ETR developed to capture deferral tax strategy which is the reason 
for its superiority over the accounting ETR (Oyeleke, Erin, & Emeni, 2016). It is derived from the 
ratio of current tax expense to pre-tax accounting income. Despite being able to capture deferral tax 
strategy, it suffers other limitations. For example, if computed as an annual measure, it is subject to 
yearly volatility (Salihu, Obid, & Annuar, 2014). Also, it is likely to understate the level of aggressive 
tax avoidance if uncertain tax benefits are included in the pre-tax accounting income (Dunbar, 
Higgins, Phillips, & Plesko, 2010). Uncertain tax benefits are tax positions upheld by a company that 
is likely to be disallowed by the relevant tax authority upon conducting a tax audit. 
2.2.3. Cash ETR  
Financial reporting is done in line with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). One of 
such principle is the accrual principle that allows for the recognition of expenses (incomes) when they 
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are incurred (earned) and not when payment is made (received). This principle, therefore, makes any 
ETR derived from the tax expense recorded in the income statement prone to accrual management 
such as valuation allowance and management discretions (Lee et al., 2015). 
To remedy the aforementioned issue of accrual management, the cash ETR was introduced. The cash 
ETR is gotten by dividing the actual amount of tax paid (tax expense recorded in the cash flow 
statement) by pre-tax income. Thus, it measures the actual tax avoided per unit of income. 
Nonetheless, it suffers from a mismatch between the numerator and the denominator. The numerator 
(cash tax expense) is devoid of accruals and is the actual tax paid while the denominator (pre-tax 
accounting income) is sourced from the income statement prepared in line with the accrual principle. 
Therefore, the ratio derived is reflective of both accrual management and tax avoidance schemes. In 
addition, since cash basis deals with movement of cash when it is received or spent notwithstanding 
the originating period (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010), the cash tax paid may be payment relating to 
current tax liabilities and liabilities deferred from previous years, thus, making the resulting ETR not 
necessarily an annual or long-run measure of tax avoidance. Be that as it may, to address the mismatch 
issue, the use of net cash flow from operating activities has been suggested (Hanlon & Heitzman, 
2010; Salihu et al., 2013).  
2.2.4. Cash flow ETR  
As pointed out above, the use of cash ETR creates a mismatch issue that may affect the interpretation 
of findings. This issue can be easily be solved by comparing a numerator and a denominator that are 
both cash based. Hence the use of cash flow ETR. The cash flow ETR is derived by dividing tax 
expense by net cash flow from operating activities (Zimmerman, 1983) or by dividing cash tax paid by 
net cash flow from operating activities. According to Gebhart (2017), the cash flow variants of ETR is 
a recent measure while Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) suggest that it differs from all other ETRs 
because of its capability to measure conforming tax avoidance. The suggestion by Hanlon and 
Heitzman (2010) is however opposed by Badertscher et al. (2016:10) who argue that cash flow ETR 
would not suffices in capturing conforming tax avoidance as it “excludes book-tax conforming tax 
strategies involving the acceleration of expenses or deferral of revenue that affect cash flow from 
operations”. In our opinion, Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) may be right as inferences based on the 
analysis carried out in this study to compare cash flow ETR with other variants of ETRs revealed a 
significant difference. 
Furthermore, aside from the issue of the capability of the cash flow ETR in capturing conforming tax 
avoidance, it is equally possible for the cash flow ETR to lead to data truncation bias in a situation 
where the net operating cash flow is negative. According to Henry and Sansing (2014), data truncation 
bias occurs when a denominator is negative and consequently, yields a negative quotient that has to be 
assumed as zero for the purpose of analysis.  This bias may create ambiguity in interpretation though; 
it may be avoided if the focus is on just companies with positive cash flow.  
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2.2.5. Henry and Sansing’s Measure 
To address the issue of truncation bias especially when the focus goes beyond profitable companies, 
Henry and Sansing’s Measure (H & S) has been developed. According to Henry and Sansing (2014), 
discarding loss years during analysis, when the focus goes beyond profitable companies, is usually not 
random and this can lead to spurious findings. Also, they noted that comparison is to be made across 
companies and industries when making inferences and that the use of pre-tax accounting income as the 
denominator does not effectively achieve this objective. According to them, using pre-tax accounting 
income as the denominator especially when the companies have different sizes creates an exaggerated 
effect on companies with low but positive pre-tax accounting income. To remedy this, they suggest the 
use of a cash tax non-conformity measure (hereafter referred to as H & S measure).   
The H & S measure is derived by performing two basic operations. First is to get the difference 
between the cash tax paid and the product of pre-tax income and the statutory rate. Second, the answer 
from the first operation is then divided by the market value of assets (Henry & Sansing, 2014). The 
final answer is what is referred to as the H & S measure. Its value is either positive, zero or negative. 
Companies that pay exactly what is expected by the tax authority will have a value of zero (no tax 
avoidance); those that paid higher will have a positive H & S value; while companies that pay lower 
will have a negative H & S value (Henry & Sansing, 2014; Gebhart, 2017). In addition, Badertscher et 
al. (2016) document that the H & S measure captures more than just non-conforming tax avoidance 
practices. This study aligns with this summation as it was observed based on the analysis done that the 
H & S measure significantly differs from the other ETR measures that are generally agreed to capture 
non-conforming tax avoidance. 
 
2.3. Hypotheses Formulation 
So far, we have seen that various measures for tax avoidance have been used by various researchers. 
However, the extent to which these measures converge or disperse may account for differences in 
findings. Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), Gebhart (2017), Lisowsky et al. (2013) and Salihu et al. (2013) 
all opine that the various measures of tax avoidance have similarities and differences with respect to 
the nature of tax avoidance they capture. This leads us to hypothesize that: 
1. There is a significant difference between the ETR based measures 
2. There is a significant difference between the ETR based measures and the H & S measure. 
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3. Methodology 
Using a descriptive research design to test the hypotheses raised, a total of 673 unbalanced firm-year 
observations of 88 companies quoted on the Nigerian Stock Exchange between 2008 and 2015 was 
used. Both annual and 3 years long-run variants of cash ETR, cash flow ETR, pre-tax cash flow ETR 
and H & S measures were computed. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. D 
Cash ETR 673 0 1 0.1436 0.20817 
Cash flow ETR 673 0 1 0.1189 0.20912 
Pre Tax Cash flow ETR 673 0 1 0.1009 0.17438 
H&S 673 -0.19 0.19 -0.0107 0.02736 
Long-run Cash ETR  517 0 1 0.154 0.19124 
Long-run Cash flow ETR 517 0 1 0.1447 0.21825 
Long-run Pre Tax Cash flow ETR 517 0 1 0.1169 0.16795 
Source: Researcher’s computation (2018) 
Table 1 depicts the descriptive statistics of the measures of tax avoidance. Based on the annual 
measures, cash ETR has the highest mean of 14.36%. This is followed by cash flow ETR, pre-tax cash 
flow ETR, and H & S having means of 11.89%, 10.09%, and -1.07% respectively. As expected, cash 
flow based ETRs have lower means than cash ETR because of the absence of accrual management in 
both the numerator and denominator and its possible ability to capture conforming tax avoidance. Pre-
tax cash flow ETR (another variant of cash flow ETR) is also lower than cash flow ETR as expected 
since cash tax paid is added back to the denominator to account for its presence in the numerator. The 
H & S measure has a negative mean revealing that companies have a negative tax preference.  The 
standard deviation which measures variability is a bit high and lies between 17% and 21% for the 
annual measures. This supports the argument that annual measures are subject to yearly volatility. 
Looking at the long run measures, it is observed that the means for all the long-run measures 
increased, thus, giving a better picture of tax avoidance. The increase as time progresses show that 
companies tend to be less tax avoidant as time passes. However, since the means of the ETRs are well 
below the statutory rate of 30%, it suggests a low tax burden by companies.  
Table 2. Correlation matrix 
  
Annual measures     
Long-run 
Measures   
    
Cash 
ETR 
Cash 
flow 
ETR 
Pre 
Tax 
Cash 
flow 
ETR H&S 
Cash 
ETR 
Cash 
flow 
ETR 
Pre 
Tax 
Cash 
flow 
ETR 
Cash ETR Correlation 1 .457** .558** 0.032 1 .444** .414** 
  Sig.  
 
0.000 0.000 0.405 
 
0.000 0.000 
Cash flow ETR Correlation .457** 1 .740** 0.036 .444** 1 .798** 
  Sig.  0.000 
 
0.000 0.357 0.000 
 
0.000 
Pre Tax Cash flow 
ETR Correlation .558** .740** 1 0.022 .414** .798** 1 
  Sig.  0.000 0.000 
 
0.575 0.000 0.000 
 H&S Correlation 0.032 0.036 0.022 1 
   
 
Sig.  0.405 0.357 0.575 
    **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).     
Source: Researcher’s computation (2018) 
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Focusing on both the annual and long-run measures, on one hand, it is observed from Table 2 that all 
the ETRs have strong associations with one another and this is equally significant and positive. This is 
not surprising as they share similarities in computation and logical argument. However, cash flow 
ETRs have a stronger association than cash ETR as predicted in extant studies due to the argument of 
the nature of tax avoidance it captures. On the other hand, there is a weak association between the 
ETR measures and the H & S measure although the association is positive. This may be based on the 
difference in computational approach and rationale as H & S is argued to capture a higher level of 
conforming tax avoidance. 
Table 3. Test for Equality of Variance 
  Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Annual 182.189 3 2688 0.00 
Long-run 10.515 2 1548 0.00 
Source: Researcher’s computation (2018) 
Apart from similarities shared by the measures of tax avoidance, there is also the possibility of 
dissimilarity. Therefore, testing for differences in measures beyond mere reliance on the standard 
deviation is required. Before the analysis of the difference, Table 3 depicts the test for homogeneity of 
variance. Both annual and long-run measures have significant probability values F(3, 2688) = 0.00 and 
F(2, 1548) = 0.00 respectively suggesting that the condition for equality of variance is violated. 
Table 4. Robust Tests for Equality of Means 
    Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Annual Welch 284.652 3 1162 0.000 
 
Brown-Forsythe 105.959 3 1992 0.000 
Long-run Welch 6.049 2 1021 0.002 
  Brown-Forsythe 5.149 2 1481 0.006 
Source: Researcher’s computation (2018) 
The robust test for means is normally carried out when there is a violation of equality of variance. For 
the use of ANOVA, it is expected that the variances are equal or at least, one of the means of the 
groups is different. Based on Table 4, due to the significant p-values obtained from the Welch test F(3, 
1162) = 0.00 and Brown-Forsythe test F(3, 1992) = 0.00 for the annual measures, and the Welch test 
F(2, 1021) = 0.002 and Brown-Forsythe test F(2, 1481) = 0.006 for the long run measures, we can 
conclude that for both measures, at least one (two) of the group means is (are) different. The post hoc 
test (Games Howell) in Table 6 substantiates this conclusion. 
Table 5. Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
    
Sum of 
Squares Df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Annual Between Groups 9.395 3 3.132 105.959 0.000 
 
Within Groups 79.445 2688 0.03 
   Total 88.84 2691 
   Long run Between Groups 0.386 2 0.193 5.149 0.006 
 
Within Groups 58.004 1548 0.037 
   Total 58.39 1550 
   Source: Researcher’s computation (2018) 
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ANOVA is used to investigate the possibility of a significant difference between three or more groups. 
The annual measures statistics F(3, 2688) = 0.00 and the long run measures statistics F(2, 1548) = 
0.006 show that there is a significant difference between the various measures as seen in Table 5. 
Consequently, as expected and documented in literature, we accept the first alternate hypothesis that 
there is a significant difference between the ETR measures. We can also infer from the Nigerian 
context that these measures capture various aspects of tax avoidance. However, to determine which of 
the measures differs, a multiple comparison is done in Table 6. 
Table 6. Multiple comparison (Games Howell Test) 
Annual (I) Group (J) Group 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
      
   
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
 
Cash flow ETR 
Pre Tax Cash flow 
ETR 0.018 0.010 0.316 -0.009 0.045 
  
Cash ETR -0.025 0.011 0.133 -0.054 0.005 
  
H&S .129* 0.008 0.000 0.109 0.151 
 
Pre Tax Cash 
flow ETR Cash flow ETR -0.018 0.010 0.316 -0.045 0.009 
  
Cash ETR -0.004* 0.010 0.000 -0.070 -0.016 
  
H&S .111* 0.007 0.000 0.094 0.129 
 
Cash ETR Cash flow ETR 0.025 0.011 0.133 -0.005 0.054 
  
Pre Tax Cash flow 
ETR .0426* 0.010 0.000 0.016 0.070 
  H&S .1543* 0.008 0.000 0.133 0.175 
 
H&S Cash flow ETR -0.129* 0.008 0.000 -0.151 -0.109 
  
Pre Tax Cash flow 
ETR -0.111* 0.007 0.000 -0.129 -0.094 
  Cash ETR -0.154* 0.008 0.000 -0.175 -0.133 
Long 
run 
Long run Cash 
flow ETR 
Long run Pre Tax 
Cash flow ETR 0.028 0.012 0.057 -0.001 0.056 
  
Long run Cash 
ETR -0.009 0.013 0.745 -0.039 0.021 
 
Long run Pre 
Tax Cash flow 
ETR 
Long run Cash 
flow ETR -0.028 0.012 0.057 -0.056 0.001 
  
Long run Cash 
ETR -0.003* 0.011 0.003 -0.063 -0.011 
 
Long run Cash 
ETR 
Long run Cash 
flow ETR 0.009 0.013 0.745 -0.021 0.039 
  
Long run Pre Tax 
Cash flow ETR -0.003* 0.011 0.003 0.011 0.063 
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.         
Source: Researcher’s computation (2018) 
Beginning with the annual measures, it is observed from Table 6 that cash ETR is significantly 
different from pre-tax cash flow ETR and H & S measure; cash flow ETR is significantly different 
from H & S measure; pre-tax cash flow is significantly different from cash ETR and H & S measure; 
while H & S measure is significantly different from all the measures. This makes us accept the second 
alternate hypothesis that H & S is significantly different from the ETR measures. This finding is not 
surprising as it confirms casual empirics that H & S distinctively measures conforming tax avoidance. 
For the long run measures, long run pre-tax cash flow ETR significantly differs from long-run cash 
ETR as expected since the latter has elements of accrual management in its denominator. 
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4. Discussion of Findings 
As expected and documented in literature, we found based on the analysis in Table 5, that there is a 
significant difference between the ETR measures. This finding agrees with studies like Gebhart 
(2017); Salihu et al. (2013); and Dunbar et al. (2010) who have investigated the similarities or 
differences associated with measures of tax avoidance within the broad classifications. Salihu et al. 
(2013) focused on Malaysian firms and conducted an Analysis of Variance amongst the individual 
members of the ETR based measures and discovered that the various measures are different and thus, 
capture various aspects of tax avoidance. They also found that the ratio of cash tax paid to cash flow 
from operations as a measure of tax avoidance differs significantly from the other ETR based 
measures. We can also infer from the Nigerian context that these measures capture various aspects of 
tax avoidance. 
Based on the second hypothesis, we found that H & S measure is significantly different from all the 
ETR measures (see Table 6). This finding is not surprising as it confirms casual empirics that H & S 
distinctively measures conforming tax avoidance. It also supports the findings of Gebhart (2017) who 
extended his investigation to include book-tax-difference and Henry and Sansing’s measure. He found 
that the effective tax rate based measures that are calculated with either cash tax paid and/or operating 
cash flow have higher variability than the other ETR based measures. He also found that cash tax paid 
to cash flow from operations has the lowest mean of the ETR based measures and most likely is the 
only ETR based measure that captures conforming tax avoidance. The analyses done in this study 
further confirms the observations of these researchers on the similarities and differences associated 
with the broad classifications.  
 
5. Conclusion, Recommendation, and Limitations 
The study examined various effective tax rate measures of corporate tax avoidance in order to see if 
there is a significant difference between the measures and provide a guide on the selection of measures 
for future studies to prevent wrong inferences. In achieving this, secondary data were sourced from 
companies listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) for the period 2008 – 2015 for 673 
unbalanced firm-years observation of 88 companies. The estimates from the ANOVA tests suggests 
that there is a significant difference between the various variants of the effective tax rate measures 
which implies that each measure captures different aspects of tax avoidance and also, the estimates 
found that there is a significant difference between the H & S measure and the effective tax rate based 
measures of tax avoidance implying that the H & S distinctly measures conforming tax avoidance. 
Based on these findings, we recommend that researchers consider their research objectives before 
deciding on the measure of tax avoidance to use in their study. For instance, the effective tax rate 
variant measures might be most appropriate when considering tax avoidance of only profitable firms 
since company tax cannot be computed on losses, while the H & S measure would be appropriate 
when the study considers tax avoidance of profitable and non-profitable companies and when 
interested in conforming tax avoidance. The study also recommends that further study is carried out 
using other measures of tax avoidance different from the ETR based measures. 
This study excludes firms in the financial sector as well as the oil and gas sector. Therefore, this 
finding may not be applicable to them due to differences in the regulatory environment for both 
financial and tax purposes. 
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